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Abstract 
Peace agreements form a crucial element of strategies to bring security from outside: they 
involve third-party mediators during the negotiation stage and often peacekeeping troops 
to guarantee the agreement at an implementation stage. Peace roundtables usually involve 
top politicians and military leaders, who negotiate, sign, and/or benefit from the agree-
ment. What is usually and conspicuously absent from peace negotiations is broad-based 
participation by those who should benefit in the first place: citizens. More specifically, the 
local level of security provision and insecurity production is rarely taken into account. 
This paper reviews parts of the academic debate on power sharing and war termination, 
touching on some key findings by the main researchers working on the topic. The ambiva-
lent African experience with Arend Lijphart’s four main ingredients of consociational de-
mocracy (grand coalition, minority veto, proportional representation, group autonomy) is 
summarized. Recent major African peace agreements (1999-2007) are analyzed, and their 
power-sharing content detailed. Most agreements contain some—though varying—
power-sharing devices. Most striking is the variation regarding the important question of 
who is sharing power with whom. Obviously, only those present at the negotiation table 
can really count on being included in major ways. Finally, three country cases are ana-
lyzed over a longer time period: Côte d’Ivoire (2002-2007), Liberia (1994-2003), and Central 
African Republic (1996-2007). The conclusion focuses on the factors of failure of peace 
agreements that place a heavy emphasis on power sharing. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Nicht immer im Interesse der Bevölkerung:  
Machtteilungsarrangements in afrikanischen Friedensabkommen 
Friedensabkommen bilden die wichtigsten Bestandteile von Strategien, um Sicherheit 
“von außen” herzustellen. Sie involvieren außenstehende Mediatoren während der Ver-
handlungsphase und häufig Friedenstruppen, um die Einhaltunge des Abkommens zu ga-
rantieren, in der Implementierungsphase. Bei Friedensverhandlungen treffen sich Spitzen-
politiker und Personen der militärischen Führung, die das Abkommen verhandeln, unter-
zeichnen und/oder direkt davon profitieren. Dagegen ist eine breite Partizipation derer, 
die in erster Linie aus dem Frieden Nutzen ziehen sollten, nicht üblich und seltsamerweise 
nicht vorgesehen. Insbesondere die lokale Ebene, die Sicherheit bereitstellt oder Unsicher-
heit erzeugt, findet keine Beachtung. 
Der vorliegende Beitrag fasst Teile der akademischen Debatte zu Machtteilung und 
Kriegsbeendigung zusammen, indem zentrale Ergebnisse der wichtigsten zum Thema  
arbeitenden Wissenschaftler aufgegriffen werden. Die ambivalente Erfahrung mit Arend 
Lijpharts vier Hauptbestandteilen der Konkordanzdemokratie (Große Koalition, Minder-
heitenveto, Verhältniswahl und Gruppenautonomie) in Afrika wird zusammengefasst. 
Jüngere afrikanische Friedensabkommen (1999-2007) werden auf ihren Gehalt an Macht-
teilung hin analysiert. Die meisten Abkommen enthalten – allerdings unterschiedliche – 
Mechanismen zur Machtteilung. Am auffälligsten ist aber die Variation in der zentralen 
Frage, wer mit wem Macht teilt. Es ist offensichtlich, dass nur die bei Verhandlungen  
teilnehmenden Akteure damit rechnen können, substanziell mit einbezogen zu werden. 
Schließlich werden drei Länderfallstudien über einen längeren Zeitraum analysiert: Côte 
d’Ivoire (2002-2007), Liberia (1994-2003) und Zentralafrikanische Republik (1996-2007). Die 
Schlussbemerkung konzentriert sich auf Faktoren für das Scheitern von Friedensabkom-
men, die Elemente der Machtteilung stark hervorgehoben hatten. 
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1 Introduction 
At first glance, power sharing looks like a logical approach to sustainable conflict manage-
ment in multiethnic societies. In fact, it has been proposed time and again and even in-
scribed more often than not in recent peace agreements. As Jarstad (2006: 9) notes, “power 
sharing is attractive to peace negotiators.” It might be less so for (all) warring parties and the 
general population. 
Peace agreements are a crucial element of strategies to bring security from outside: they in-
volve third-party mediators during the negotiation stage and often peacekeeping troops to 
guarantee the agreement at an implementation stage. Foreign policy strategies by major out-
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side powers may be at work when designing a peace agreement. At the same time, peace 
roundtables usually involve top politicians and military leaders, who negotiate, sign, and/or 
benefit from the agreement. What is usually and conspicuously absent from peace negotia-
tions is broad-based participation by those who should benefit in the first place: citizens. 
More specifically, the local level of security provision and insecurity production is rarely 
taken into account. 
This paper first presents parts of the academic debate on power sharing and war termination, 
touching on some key findings by the main researchers working on the topic. Those findings 
do not confer a clear image of the effectiveness of power sharing. The African experience 
with Arend Lijphart’s four main ingredients of consociational democracy—often wrongly 
said to be identical to the main devices in diplomatic approaches to power-sharing arrange-
ments in peace agreements—is summarized. Experiences are ambivalent. The paper then 
concentrates on recent major African peace agreements (1999-2007), detailing their power-
sharing content in a synopsis. Variations in power-sharing ingredients are important; some 
cases of “cheap diplomacy” can be detected (for example, Chad), but even “expensive diplo-
macy” like that in the Comorian case has not resulted in clear success. In a last step, three 
country cases are analyzed—where necessary—over a longer time period: Côte d’Ivoire 
(2002-2007), Liberia (1994-2003), and Central African Republic (1996-2007). The three cases 
differ in the weight and origin of outside intervention forces and guarantors of peace agree-
ments as well as in the actual quality of power-sharing devices. The conclusion focuses on the 
factors of failure of peace agreements that place a heavy emphasis on power sharing. 
2 Sustainable Peace by Peace Agreements? 
There is a large and growing body of literature on the causes of successful conflict resolu-
tion. It would be impossible to give an account of all arguments put forward and all ap-
proaches followed in this field. Only a selection of the main works will be quoted (selec-
tively) here to underline what kind of question is rarely addressed: those relating to the local 
level of peace agreements and its nexus with power-sharing formulas contained in peace 
agreements. Let us consider some major academic contributions to the debate first. 
Fen Osler Hampson in his book Nurturing Peace (1996) tests four possible explanations of 
the success of peace processes: the international support of the peace process; the ripeness of 
the conflict (following the classical Zartman notion); systemic/regional power balances; and 
finally the quality of the peace agreement, in particular whether the agreement includes a 
power-sharing arrangement. As a result of his study Hampson dismisses the “quality argu-
ment” on the bases of a five cases comparison (Cyprus, Angola, Namibia, El Salvador, Cam-
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bodia): well-designed agreements would be as prone to failure as badly designed agree-
ments. One critique of Hampson’s work is that he fails to consider that civil wars vary 
enormously in terms of the number of warring parties, the war aims of the parties, levels of 
death and destruction, the size of the country, etc. and that there would be good reason to 
suspect that inter alia the quality of design of an agreement may be the product of those and 
other basic variables (Stedman 2002; 5). Another obvious critique could be that Hampson 
only focuses on the “objective” quality of an agreement, but does not analyze whether it is 
termed acceptable by stakeholders. This quality in turn may be much more a function of 
who designed it and how acceptable the process of negotiation would be for the warring 
parties. The quality of an agreement would then be not “objective,” but largely “subjective.” 
However, Hampson’s study is of particular interest as he does not stop with the formal sign-
ing of a peace agreement in terming a negotiation process a success but rather enlarges the 
focus to include the implementation phase. His type of structured small-N comparison with 
a limited number of cases is what is aimed for in this paper as well. 
Barbara Walter (1997), focusing on third-party guarantees as the most salient factor in success 
nevertheless posits that the more power sharing built into an agreement the less international 
commitment would be needed. This belief in power sharing as a miracle formula is not rare, 
but should lead to further questions. What is meant by power sharing? Who has to share 
power with whom and who can still be excluded from the sharing arrangement? Those ques-
tions are essential as power sharing can be limited to only a few areas of governance, as power 
may be shared between the government and only hand-picked rebel groups, and as radical 
movements on the one hand, civilian opposition parties on the other, are often left out. 
Stedman and Rothchild (1996) remind us that the alternative to a weak agreement is often 
no agreement. It would be all too easy to blame the peace agreement and the mediator who 
produced it when conflict is reignited in its aftermath. Instead, it would be important to fo-
cus on barriers to implementation. Stedman (1997) in a widely quoted article makes a case 
for focusing on so-called spoilers as the most important barrier to implementation. While 
Stedman fortunately brings back in a number of issues of importance such as actors’ inter-
ests and intents in the discussion and therefore can be seen as an important advocate in be-
ing less naïve about peace processes, some critical aspects of his work have to be recorded: 
First, by neglecting the quality question in peace agreements spoilers are always portrayed 
as the “bad guys” as they step out of something that is per se perceived as good—regardless 
of what harm it does to particular group interests. Secondly, the spoilers of the peace proc-
ess could have been the defendants of the democratization process earlier; arguably this is 
the story of the Ivorian students’ union Fédération estudiantine et scolaire de Côte d’Ivoire 
(FESCI), a major actor of violence in the latest crisis (Konaté 2003). Or a rebel movement that 
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is accommodated by a peace process and apparently sticking better to the provisions of the 
peace agreement than the government may have been the spoiler of earlier reforms. And is it 
correct to see the Front Patriotique Ivoirien (FPI), President Gbagbo’s political party, in Côte 
d’Ivoire as the main spoiler of peace? Briefly in power (and, according to the party itself, 
pursuing a reform agenda) before being menaced by semi-successful rebels, it was subse-
quently more active in “spoiling” the existing peace process which was seen as unjust and 
imposed from outside (see below). The spoiler perspective may hide more than it can reveal. 
Finally, Stedman (2002; 13)—surprisingly for a social scientist—asserts that “our attempts to 
assess the intent and motivation of parties during peace implementation must rest on intel-
ligence, not indicators” and that motives for noncompliance should be assessed “through in-
telligence, informants, surveillance, and reading of documents” (ibid.). Not only is he dis-
missing all local knowledge, he also simply ignores all preexisting analysis on the social ba-
sis of actors assembled by different disciplines and local sources beyond “informants.”. This 
is hardly acceptable for area studies specialists with an in-depth knowledge of societies 
based on long-term observation as it should be for all social scientists using different quanti-
tative or qualitative methods of information gathering. 
Quantitative analysis exists in peace research. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) have tested a good 
number of variables that may increase the likelihood of war termination through negotiation 
using a dataset of civil wars since 1945. They could come up with a number of robust statis-
tical results that show that some factors provide for an easier (existence of treaties, of a UN 
peace mission, precedence of a long and costly war) or more difficult environment (identity 
war, widespread human misery, high number of factions, natural resource dependence) for 
implementation of peace settlements. That the mere existence of peace agreements would 
make a difference comes as a surprise. The quality and the form of power-sharing agree-
ments are not taken into account in their hypotheses. 
Hoddie and Hartzell (2005: 83) use power sharing in a broader sense than others, also in-
volving informal rules and not only constitutional dispositions. Additionally, in their study 
they use not institutions as an independent variable (for explaining the durability of peace), 
but dispositions in the peace agreement—whether implemented or not. And they distin-
guish between different levels of power sharing: a) central (political), b) territorial (federal-
ism/decentralization), c) military, and d) economic power sharing. Consecutive hypotheses 
are formulated and statistically tested. Their conclusion is positive while differentiated: 
“Power sharing provisions in peace settlements have a demonstrated ability to provide a 
sense of security to former combatants facing the immediate prospect of working together 
peacefully after a severe conflict such as a civil war” (103). One only wonders how they 
could come to this conclusion without asking the combatants. They continue “In particular, 
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our research indicates that both military and territorial power sharing have a positive role to 
play in fostering post-war peace” (103). Again, this seems a premature conclusion at least for 
the aspect of territorial power sharing, when applied to the African cases. 
Pearson et al. (2006) criticize an earlier contribution of Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 
(2001) that had a similar design mostly for not caring about the stability of peace over time 
when including the case of a peace agreement into their sample, but just on its (immediate) 
implementation. Curiously, Pearson et al. arbitrarily take a six-months period of non re-
currence of violence to decide that a settlement has taken place. They also use a larger 
sample of violent conflicts including so-called low-intensity conflicts and come to diver-
gent results from Hartzell et al.; power sharing (in the “territorial autonomy” form) did 
not prove significant. The only statistically significant factor for conflict settlement success 
of Hartzell et al. proved third-party enforcement. The Pearson et al. approach has its flaws, 
though. It is neither evident that a conflict that breaks out in the same country after a 
shorter period is still the same (for example, involving the very same actors) or that a rela-
tive lull of war for over a year without proper peace is a sign of success, particularly tak-
ing into account low-intensity conflicts of, say, the Casamance (Senegal) type. Another se-
vere problem: The data used is drawn from three sources: Keesing’s Contemporary Ar-
chives, New York Times Abstracts, and an anonymous website (Onwar.com). This is 
hardly convincing as turns of low-intensity conflicts frequently do not make it to the atten-
tion of international media. 
As a strong critique of “liberal Peace-building” Paris (1997, 2004) claims that implementers 
of peace agreements often exacerbate already existing divisions in societies. Outsiders that 
impose democracy or liberal economy at the end of a civil war and then quickly leave would 
lend a dangerous service to war-torn societies by generating a number of destabilizing side 
effects. Paris’ high standards for success may be a problem in his analysis, as some of his 
failures would not be termed such by other authors (Stedman 2002, 19), but he may also be 
one-sided in believing that the normative orientation of outsiders would be in opposition to 
(all) local actors. Democracy and liberal economy may not be so controversial in all world 
regions (for example, in Africa south of the Sahara) as it might be in the Arab world. How-
ever, what is important in Paris’ perspective is the pin-pointing of the not so neutral or inno-
cent role of mediators and peacekeepers. 
Tull and Mehler (2005: 375) argue that the unsteady support for democracy in Africa from 
Western donors and the enhanced international standing of armed movements in the post-
1989 period have induced would-be leaders to conquer state power by violent rather than 
civilian means: 
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This becomes particularly evident in regard to Western efforts to solve violent conflict 
through power-sharing agreements. The hypothesis is put forward that the institu-
tionalisation of this practice for the sake of “peace”, i.e. providing rebels with a share 
of state power, has important demonstration effects across the continent. It creates an 
incentive structure would-be leaders can seize upon by embarking on the insurgent 
path as well. As a result, and irrespective of their effectiveness in any given case, 
power-sharing agreements contribute to the reproduction of insurgent violence. 
This is shown by recalling some recent peace settlements in Africa (Burundi, Rwanda, the 
DRC, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, Central African Republic and Chad).1 
Roeder (2005) is one of those authors who advocate a liberal solution to conflicts. He criti-
cizes power-sharing formulas and puts forward his notion of “power dividing.” By this no-
tion he means a combination of tamed executive, checks and balances on all levels, putting 
the rights of the individual before the rights of groups, etc., in practice: a liberal democracy. 
His own statistical test supports his claim, and he concludes, “The argument is that liberal-
ism is also realism” (80). What might get lost in this argumentation is that a full transition to 
liberalism is not in all cases realistic. 
In sum, power sharing has found support and critique in the academic debate on peace 
agreements, but maybe this depends too much of the individual researchers’ understanding 
of the concept itself. It therefore makes sense to have a second look on what the classical au-
thor on the topic had in mind. Admittedly, power sharing in peace agreements has a less 
“preventive” character as intended when power sharing is an ingredient of institution-
building in a less conflictive situation. 
2.1 What Lijphart’s Classical Study Tells Us—and Doesn’t Tell Us—about African Cases 
The defendants of power-sharing arrangements as the core element of postconflict peace 
frequently base their arguments on the work of the Dutch political scientist Arend Lijphart 
on consociational democracy (Lemarchand 2007). They claim that power sharing would es-
sentially help to avoid secession and bring more fertile solutions to conflicts in plural socie-
ties. The claims of ethnic and other parts of society could be integrated into institutional ar-
rangements which would in turn guarantee a meaningful participation in political power. 
This would avoid more costly alternatives of a fully fledged war. “Spheres of autonomy” for 
the identified groups would be a necessity as would be proportional representation and veto 
                                                     
1  We were criticized by Lemarchand (2007) for allegedly not wanting to take into account rebel organization’s grievances, in 
particular those that were excluded and had spoiling capacities. This was not our argument, as we primarily wanted to 
show that peace agreements fail to take into account civilian opposition’s grievances voiced in peace time and end up in 
sidelining those more constructive forces. 
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rights. This may sound convincing in the first place. Who would not like to avoid victims 
and terminate wars around the globe—as easy as by adjusting institutional design? 
But let us consider first, again in some detail, the essentials of Lijphart’s model of consocia-
tional democracy (1977): 
1) The main element of consociational democracy is the broad-based grand coalition in-
cluding political parties not needed to form a majority. 
2) Minority veto: Minorities in existential danger can veto important decisions leading to 
new negotiations on the consensus mode. 
3) Proportional representation in providing for all major political and administrative posi-
tions and in the distribution of public means. 
4) Group autonomy, that is, all decisions of superior national interest are taken on the cen-
tral level by the grand coalition. But those with less outreach and concerning just the 
context of the autonomous group, are dealt with in geographically limited entities (this 
can be implemented best in a federal system). 
Let us first reflect the African experience with these elements: 
The government of national unity, very familiar to Africa since the 1960s, comes immedi-
ately to mind when evoking a grand coalition (Rothchild/Foley 1988). The African experi-
ence with this instrument is ambivalent, as it might have avoided severe conflicts in some 
states but also precluded democracy in others.2 Over-sized governments are not rare while 
the forced inclusion of smaller partners can be encountered, starting with some less than 
voluntary formations of unified parties in the 1960s. Above all, coalition agreements were 
rarely enacted by party congresses, but just signed by party leaders, the followers get 
ditched in this process (arguably the history of RENAMO in Mozambique). 
The minority veto is a rarely established feature in African constitutions. This by no means 
tells us something about real, but often discrete, veto players in African polities—very of-
ten the military hierarchy, sometimes traditional kings, and in some places religious lead-
ers. Lijphart (1977: 38) himself writes that the minority veto can be an informal and un-
written understanding. In the case of Burundi, the Tutsi minority had the “ultimate” veto 
in form of the monopoly on military power (Sullivan 2005: 88). As Sullivan notes, it was 
“the threat of losing that ultimate veto which caused it to be used, thus ending the attempt 
at peace” (ibid.). 
Proportional representation (beyond legislative elections) has also rarely made its entry into an 
African constitution as the fundament of all policy regulations. However, some ethnically po-
larized countries have experienced recurrently a practice of near-to proportional representa-
                                                     
2  A side effect is the probable carving up of ministries by different interests that might lead to “development failure” as each 
group tries to maximize its own rents. 
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tion in higher offices. One country where the media counts and compares the ethnic propor-
tions of newly appointed governments, or a new higher military command is Cameroon. This 
does not make the country any more a consociational democracy. The record is more bal-
anced with regard to proportional representation at national elections (often only introduced 
through a change of the electoral law). The following African countries have recently made 
experience with proportional representation in legislative elections (PR): South Africa (a pure 
PR system), Angola, Niger and Sierra Leone (PR in medium and large multi-member con-
stituencies), Burundi and Guinea-Bissau (PR in small constituencies)3. Note that in small con-
stituencies proportionality cannot be achieved. 
Finally, the continent has not a strong experience with federal experiments. At the moment, 
Comoros (since 2002), Ethiopia (since 1994; earlier period 1952-62), Nigeria (since 1954/19604), 
South Africa (since 1996), Sudan (since 2005, earlier period 1972-83) and Tanzania (since 1964) 
have a federal system. In Ethiopia (earlier period: Ethiopia and Eritrea), Sudan (Northern and 
Southern part), Tanzania (Tanganyika and Zanzibar) only two states constitute the federation 
and could probably not be seen as ideal cases to accommodate group interests in a multieth-
nic setting. Although Tanzania had held together, serious conflicts in Zanzibar can be related 
to the competition of political parties on the union question. However, in all cases a conflict 
mitigating effect was sought when introducing a federal system. 
Cameroon 1962-1972 (also a two-state federation; terminated through a unilateral change of 
constitution, nominally endorsed by referendum), Congo 1960-1965 (terminated by Mobu-
tu’s coup), Kenya 1963-65 and Uganda 1962-66 (abrogated unilaterally) experienced only 
short periods of federalism. There are good and persuasive arguments for and against what 
Bunce and Watts call “ethnofederalism” (2005: 136f): On the one hand it may counter two 
typical temptations in multiethnic settings (of minorities to defect and of majorities to domi-
nate), it may also legitimize difference and empower minorities, thereby creating trust. On 
the other hand it may also undermine commonality; differences and identities may be un-
necessarily cemented. It may help avoid cooperation and it may also give minorities the in-
stitutional prerequisites for later secession. The South African case usually gets a positive 
rating (as do India and Canada), all other African cases are much more debated. The Como-
ros case stands out for lengthy negotiations with many setbacks, facilitated with external 
help (not least by South Africa). 
                                                     
3  According to project data provided by Anika Becher (GIGA Institute of African Affairs), Burundi has changed from small 
to medium sized constituencies in 2004. I am grateful for the provision of this data. A number of segmented electoral sys-
tems with PR elements could be added. 
4  Nigeria’s federal system was already established under colonial rule and continued after independence (1960). It was 
briefly abandoned in 1966, but quickly reinstalled in the same year. I want to thank Eva Range for checking dates and add-
ing/correcting details in this list. 
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In recent years, there has been a strong tendency in establishing a dose of decentralization, 
sometimes in the name of conflict prevention—and power sharing (Spears 2000: 115, Craw-
ford/Hartmann 2008 forthcoming). But decentralization can equally have adverse affects on 
conflicts. Transferring competences from the central to the local level may come with new 
conflicts on a local level. A major reform (and a true decentralization would be one) always 
creates winners and losers and the latter might not be willing to give in. Additionally, local 
elites are not necessarily more peace-loving or less corrupt than those on the central level 
(Mehler 2002). Decentralization as the currently most common translation of the “group 
autonomy” ingredient of power sharing in Africa can only have a positive effect when the 
following questions can be answered positively: 
- Does decentralization contribute significantly to reduce structural disparities between 
groups in conflict, especially the more equitable distribution of public goods and ser-
vices? Or does it exacerbate such disparities? Note that better-off local and regional units 
may be in a better position to profit from such a reform. 
- Does decentralization further or obstruct the formation of autonomous spheres of power 
outside official or oppositional organizations? Note that decentralization may transport 
conflict from the central to the local level and create incentives to reduce a preexisting in-
formal autonomy. 
- Does decentralization enhance or undermine the ability of local actors to promote crisis 
prevention and reconciliation? Note that the ability of central actors (including police, 
the National Assembly) to do so probably will be reduced and need to be matched. 
- Does decentralization allow for revenues from resources localized in a particular region 
to be shared on an acceptable basis for both the local entity and the society as a whole? 
The rather young experience with decentralization has not yet allowed to draw robust con-
clusions on those questions. As noted, federalism, Nigerian or Comorian style, is certainly 
no proof for viable conflict mitigation. The South African experience, still young, may be the 
only positive example to be cited on the African continent. 
Taken together, we can hardly say that the four main elements of consociational democracy as 
Lijphart understands them would have had uniformly positive effects on African countries. 
A different argument against power-sharing formulas in African peace settlements is even 
more relevant. Lijphart’s reflections are based on a completely different model of conflict 
resolution than a quick mediation from outside in an already highly escalated situation. Ter-
rence Lyons (2002: 220) reminds us that “Pacts are more likely among elites with relatively 
clear and loyal constituencies, such as traditional political parties, labor unions, or other in-
stitutions in a corporatist setting. In the aftermath of a civil war, political and social organi-
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zations generally are absent and the ability of militia leaders to deliver the compliance of 
their own fighters is often questionable”. This is one hint to why the consociational democ-
racy argument should only be carefully used in the context of resolving African civil wars. 
Lyons (2002: 221) also tells us that power-sharing pacts may best be expected after postset-
tlement elections. By contrast, Roeder and Rothchild (2005) argue that power sharing may 
have beneficial effects in the initiation phase of a transition from war to peace while proba-
bly more difficult effects in the consolidation phase. Taken together both arguments tell us 
that power sharing is more likely late in the process and more beneficial early-on. This 
makes it a difficult element of a peace-building strategy. 
Lijphart’s classical cases were Belgium, Switzerland, Lebanon and Cyprus, all states where 
linguistic or religious differences were frozen over a long time period—not the multiplying 
cases of acute crisis management in Africa with more diffuse conflict constellations. More 
comparable to the cases already cited was South Africa in 1994: the conflict dimensions were 
clear as were the group boundaries; the lack of a perspective for a military victory of one 
side was clear to all sides of the game; and there was an obvious broad will among the elites, 
again on all sides, to come to a pact solution. It is not by chance that Lijphart had published 
a book on South Africa in 1985. And his thinking was very influential at this crucial turning 
point of South African history.5 Sisk and Stefes (2005) argue that the South African case 
stands out for a full power-sharing agreement in a transitional phase until 1996 (the Roeder/ 
Rothchild argument), while a consolidated constitution then took away some of the aspects 
of formal power sharing. 
Roeder and Rothchild (2005: 12) view the intrinsic dilemma of power-sharing arrangements 
in the contradictions between the immediate inclusionary strategy in a first phase of getting 
a peace agreement and the long-term institutional arrangements in a later phase. Walter 
(2002) shows that power-sharing pacts are likely to be unstable over time and concludes that 
“a second transition will almost certainly be needed to maintain peace over the long term” 
(167). It is, however, obvious that it could be very difficult to get from phase 1 to phase 2 
with the personnel and the transitional institutions of phase 1 carrying with them all their 
interests to maintain status and privileges. Doubts are permitted that mediators even think 
in this long-term perspective. This may not be blamed entirely on the acting persons since 
the challenges are often immense. One key problem of the fire department diplomacy that is 
more typical to Africa than any tailor-made solution is the right choice of mediation partners 
on the rebel side. 
                                                     
5  Lijphart 1985. Some of his ideas later met with criticism, see Donald L. Horowitz: A Democratic South Africa? Constitu-
tional Engineering in a Divided Society. Berkeley: University of California Press 1991. 
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- In a context devoid of peace, maybe with a record of only manipulated elections over 
decades, it is very difficult to know who can command loyalty and legitimacy of specific 
groups. 
- The assumption is much more realistic that the self-declared leaders and representatives 
of a neglected group are rather politico-military entrepreneurs without a genuine inter-
est in representing something beyond themselves. They are usually selected as negotia-
tion partners for their spoiling capacities. 
- The groups to be represented are usually designed as ethnic groups while they will only 
rarely form an undisputed entity. The outer limits of these groups are in fact frequently 
disputed and the internal homogeneity is a fiction. Very often, the “ethnogenesis” of 
those groups have not yet come to an end in contrast to conflicts that were frozen for 
centuries. Under these circumstances it also becomes completely unclear, which institu-
tions should guarantee group interests. 
Over recent decades a good number of peace settlements were agreed upon in the name of 
preventive diplomacy whose sustainability could have been doubted early on. Roeder and 
Rothchild (2005: 3) count 22 comprehensive peace settlements in ethnically divided societies 
worldwide.6 In some of those cases severe escalations happened in their aftermath (Rwanda 
1993, Burundi 1994, Sierra Leone 1996, Afghanistan 2001), in others additional agreements 
were necessary to more or less stabilize the situation (again Burundi 2001 and 2002, DR 
Congo 2002 and 2003). The most famous case is without doubt the agreement of Arusha 
(August 4, 1993) to end civil war in Rwanda. Many observers in hindsight see the agreement 
as a conflict aggravating factor—leading to genocide—as it regulated power sharing in a 
way that a very high number of positions fell to the rebels. This was unacceptable to the 
hardliners of the Habyarimana regime which at this time had not yet lost the war and main-
tained all possibilities to spoil the process (Lemarchand 1994, Prunier 1995)7. Spears (2000: 
110) additionally presents the exclusion of the extremist CDR party from the negotiations as 
a central problem. And Lemarchand (2007: 5) sees the Arusha negotiations as “the continua-
tion of civil war by other means” when participants of the negotiation could continue to 
fight in order to negotiate form a position of maximum strength. Arusha stands out for what 
is commonly called cheap diplomacy. 
                                                     
6  Azerbaidjan 1991, Croatia 1991, Slovenia 1991, Eritrea 1993, South Africa 1993, Rwanda 1993, Burundi 1994, Bosnia 1995, 
Sierra Leone 1996, Northern Ireland 1998, Kosovo 1999, Afghanistan 2001, Burundi 2001, Macedonia 2001-2002, Burundi 
2002, Congo 2002, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 2002, East Timor 2002, DRC 2003, Côte d’Ivoire 2003, Irak 2003, 
Sudan 2004. Some gaps and data problems may be noted here, inter alia the peace agreement 2000 in Djibouti and the 
failed peace agreement in Angola 1991. 
7  By contrast, Paris (2004: 69-78) pinpoints the forced dual process of political and economic liberalization inherent in the 
Arusha accords, but would not conclude differently on the quality of the process. And Walter (2002: 144) sees the failure of 
UN implementation of the accord as its key problem. 
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3 Recent African Peace Agreements 
In this light, let us briefly discuss those African peace agreements established after Hod-
die/Hartzell stop their calculation (1998) and take only recent African cases before moving to 
our particular cases in more detail (Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Central African Republic). 
After Arusha more complex negotiations have taken place in Africa’s severest crises with—
for the time being better results. In the civil war of Burundi and in the complex DR Congo 
crisis with internal and cross-border elements very costly rounds of negotiation took place 
with a number of outside mediators.8 In both cases doubts were voiced as to the motivations 
of negotiation delegations to slow down the process or playing time (Tull/Mehler 2005). 
Partly, it was feared that the maintenance of privileges such as enjoying first-class hotels and 
food in foreign capitals, would motivate this behavior. Other doubts were voiced about the 
early exclusion of so-called “negative forces,” in particular Hutu extremists (Lemarchand 
2007: 9). In the case of Burundi the military weakening of Hutu rebels in parallel with a po-
litical weakening of the Tutsi establishment over the years of inconclusive negotiation had 
certainly as much weight as a success factor as the substance of what was on the negotiation 
table. While both countries still struggle to gain a respectable level of stability we can at least 
say that a hasty procedure was avoided. The ‘cheap diplomacy’ label may not be justified. 
However, it is a problematic legacy of the last years that the most important civil political 
parties of the 1990s (in both countries) have become a shadow of themselves. 
This is true for Burundi and in particular for the victorious party in the 1993 elections. The 
Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU) had lost its leader with the assassination 
of President Melchior Ndadaye in a bloody coup attempt in 1993. In a second military coup 
d’Etat it was entirely removed from power in 1996. But even its old rival Union pour le Pro-
grès National (UPRONA) did not fare much better. In the case of the DR Congo the decline 
of the Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social (UDPS) of longtime opponent Etienne 
Tchisekedi is as relevant. How to explain this—beyond bad tactics or strategy? At the nego-
tiation table actors of violence were dominant, not the civilian opposition. And the frustra-
tion of UDPS militants was cited as one of the handicaps of peacebuilding in the DRC. By 
the way, both countries were former Belgian colonies and were therefore frequently seen 
with Belgian eyes, meaning looking for analogies of conflicts between Flames and Wallones. 
This also meant that Lijphart’s ideas about consociational democracy were not unknown to a 
number of stakeholders and mediators. Typically, a strong emphasis on minority rights for 
Tutsi was encapsulated in the Burundian Constitution of 1992 and the preceding Charta of 
National Unity (1991) (Mehler 1994). 
                                                     
8  Southall (2006: 210) recalls that over 20 meetings between September 2000 and early 2003 alone, hosted variously by South 
Africa and/or regional governments were held. 
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At least in name, the peace agreement between central government and southern rebels in 
Sudan is a comprehensive one (Mattes 2006). The agreement did nothing to stop—some 
would say it even contributed to—the new bloody conflict in Darfur that at least resembles 
genocide (Woodward 2006: 177). The nonassociation of other conflict zones in Sudan (and 
other local rebel movements) must be termed problematic as the “national cake” (that is, oil 
from South Sudan and top positions in the state apparatus) was already shared between two 
partners.9 It may also turn out to be problematic that the very name of the “Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement” (CPA) tends to ignore the continuing heterogeneity of the South Suda-
nese rebels. So is the CPA a success? For the time being it may better be termed an agree-
ment with ambivalent outcome. 
The paradox of inclusion is an aspect that needs to be highlighted here. In numerous cases 
around Africa the inclusion of one rebel group in a peace agreement and subsequently in a 
power-sharing government left others excluded, who could here find an incentive to 
strengthen their war efforts—in order to be included at the next stage. This may undermine 
the sustainability of peace. What this involves for democracy has been shown above for Bu-
rundi and DR Congo: moderate civilian parties are more easily excluded from these deals 
and scarcely receive international attention (Tull/Mehler 2005; Jarstad 2006). 
What makes peace agreements successful? It looks very arbitrary to give out time frames of 
the type already described: after x months of nonrecurrence of violence,10 or when in a sec-
ond escalation the magical 1,000 battle-deaths threshold was not crossed. After all, peace is 
when people think they are at peace. The perceptions of the population are the best indicator 
of successful and failing peace settlements. But these data are missing and are usually not 
generated. In its absence, I have opted for including agreements as successes when the same 
actors or their proxies/successors did not fight each other until early December 2007, as fail-
ures when they or their proxies/successors did and as ambivalent cases when the outcome 
was unclear or contributed to the escalation of a different conflict. 
Before moving to the three cases where an in-depth analysis is proposed (Liberia, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Central African Republic) let us get an overview of recent African cases (south of 
the Sahara) of peace agreements and their power-sharing content (see Table 1). 
This overview shows that power sharing was a prominent aspect of most recent African 
peace settlements. The big exception is obviously the Casamance conflict between separatist 
rebels and the central government of Senegal. Here, numerous peace agreements have failed 
to have any sustainable effects. It would be still risky to blame this on the absence of any 
                                                     
9  The failure of peace negotiations for Darfur is well described in a detailed way by an insider in Alex de Waal: I will not 
sign, London Review of Books, www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n23/waal01_.html (access December 11, 2007). 
10  Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild (2001:195) calculated that the peace agreements they examined on average lasted three and 
a half years before conflict re-escalated. 
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power-sharing ingredient (the 2001 and 2004 agreements deal predominantly with disar-
mament, demobilization, free circulation and mine clearance). It could well be linked to the 
amorphous nature of the MFDC rebel movement and the fact that their historical leader 
Abbé Senghor cannot sign on behalf of the different scattered wings. 
Another result of this overview is that there are important variations in the form power 
sharing can take. Even more striking is the variation in the important question of who is 
sharing power with whom. Obviously, only those present at the negotiation table could 
really count on being included in major ways. 
Table 1: Essentiala Power-sharing Elements of Recent African Peace Agreements (since 1999) 
Country Participants/ 
cosignatoriesb 
Power-sharing  
details 
Successes 
Angola,  
April 4, 2002  
(Luanda, Angola)c 
Army representa-
tives of government 
and UNITA 
Military: Integration of a substantial number of UNITA officers and 
soldiers into the national army; the rest to be demobilized. 
Burundi,  
October 8, 2003d  
(Pretoria, South  
Africa) 
Transitional gov-
ernment of Burundi 
and CNDD-FDD 
Central/political: Executive: CNDD-FDD gets four ministries includ-
ing a minister of state. The presidency will consult the minister of 
state on all key matters. 
Legislative: CNDD-FDD gets second vice president and deputy sec-
retary-general of the bureau, plus 15 seats. 
Military: Integrated general staff and the officer corps, to be com-
posed of 60% officers selected from the government army and 40% 
officers from the FDD. The allocation of command posts shall be on 
the basis of ethnic balance (50-50). 
Police: General staff 65% government and 35% CNDD-FDD; princi-
ple of 50-50 ethnic balance. 
Territorial: Provincial level: CNDD-FDD gets three governors’ posi-
tions plus five advisors. 
Local level: CNDD-FDD gets 30 administrators. 
Economy: CNDD-FDD heads 20% of public enterprises (exact dis-
tribution to be negotiated later). 
Djibouti,  
May 12, 2001  
(Djibouti)e 
Government, FRUD Military: Integration of FRUD combatants into the security forces 
(or compensation) (weak). 
Territorial: Decentralization law as an annex of the agreement, crea-
tion of five (largely autonomousf) regions, three members each of 
both signatories in a National Decentralization Commission (12 in 
total). 
Liberia,  
August 18, 2003  
(Accra, Ghana)g 
Government, 
LURD, MODEL, 
and 18 political par-
ties  
Central/political: Transitional government and legislature with war-
ring parties (over)represented. No limits for LURD and MODEL to 
form parties. 
Military: New armed forces to be drawn from government forces, 
LURD, and MODEL, “as well as from civilians with appropriate 
background and experience..” 
Economy: Major state corporations and agencies shared between 
warring parties (and the other civilian signatories). 
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Country Participants/ 
cosignatoriesb 
Power-sharing  
details 
Ambivalent Cases 
Central African  
Republic,  
February 2, 2007  
(Syrte, Libya),h  
April 13, 2007  
(Birao, CAR)i 
Syrte: warlord Ab-
doulaye Miskine 
and ex-minister 
André Ringui de 
Gaillard for FDPC 
and UFDR, Justice 
Minister Otto for 
government; Birao: 
prefect, local com-
mander for UFDR 
Political: Participation of UFDR in “management of state affairs” 
(vague). 
Military: Integration of rebel fighters into the national army. 
Comoros,  
February 17, 2001  
(Fomboni,  
Comoros)j 
Nine key politicians 
of Moheli, Anjouan 
and Grande Co-
mores/OAU, OIF, 
EU as guarantors  
Political: Creation of a tripartite commission to decide on transition 
modalities and to prepare a constitutional referendum plus elec-
tions. Decisions in the commission by consensus. After the transi-
tion: government of national union, equal representation. (The con-
stitution later confirms the rotating presidency—a key element of 
the failed Antananarivo agreement, see below). 
Congo,  
November 16, 1999,  
December 29, 1999  
(Pointe Noire/ 
Brazzaville, Congo)k 
CNR, government Central/political: Creation of a follow-up committee to prepare na-
tional dialogue (weak). 
Military: Limited integration of rebel combatants into the national 
army. 
Côte d’Ivoire,  
March 4, 2007  
(Ouagadougou/ 
Burkina Faso)l 
Laurent Gbagbo 
(head of state), Guil-
laume Soro (head of 
the rebellion)/Blaise 
Compaoré (presi-
dent of Burkina 
Faso, mediator) 
Central/political: Rebel leader Soro becomes prime minister (sepa-
rate decree), a permanent framework of concertation is created with 
Ouattara and Bédié joining the signatories. 
Territorial: Redeployment of the administration to the north of the 
country; no particular measure of power sharing. 
Military: Creation of a joint command center (equal shares) to pre-
pare for a joint integrated army. 
DRC,  
April 19, 2002  
(Sun City, South  
Africa)m  
Government, MLC, 
RCD-ML, RCD-N, 
six different Mai-
Mai groups, 19 po-
litical parties, 45 
representatives of 
the “Forces Vives” 
(civil society) 
Central/political: In the transition phase Kabila remains president of 
the republic; Jean-Pierre Bemba (MLC) becomes prime minister; 
president of National Assembly goes to RDC; and president of the 
Senate to the unarmed opposition. Signatories to the agreement to 
present candidates for government positions. General dispositions 
to fill transitional National Assembly and Senate by signatories. 
Sudan,  
January 9, 2005  
(Naivasha, Kenya)n 
Government, 
SPLM/A 
Central/political: Executive: Transitional National Executive with 
52% of seats held by NCP, 28% SPLM. 14% other northern political 
forces, 6% other southern political forces. Head of state remains in 
place; first vice president is SPLA leader John Garang. 
Legislative: Transitional Assembly with 52% of seats held by NCP, 
28% SPLM. 14% other northern political forces, 6% other southern 
political forces. More favorable terms for NCP and SPLM on the 
state level (70%). 
Territorial: Southern Sudan becomes an autonomous region for 6 
years; referendum about secession option to be held afterwards. De-
centralization with significant devolution of powers to state and lo-
cal level. 
Economy: Sharing of oil incomes from oil produced in southern Su-
dan on a 50-50 basis. 
Military: North and South with separate armies operating only in 
their territory. Joint force of 21,000 for the disputed territories 
Abyei, Nuba, and Blue Nile State 
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Country Participants/ 
cosignatoriesb 
Power-sharing  
details 
Failures 
Chad,  
December 14, 2003  
(Ouagadougou, 
Burkina Faso) 
Togoi Abbo, MDJT 
faction leader exiled 
in Burkina 
Faso/Chad’s secu-
rity minister, Ab-
deramane Moussa  
Central/political: Transformation of MDJT into a political party, par-
ticipation in government (vague). 
Military: Integration of rebels into the national army (vague). 
Chad,  
December 24, 2006  
(Tripolis, Libya)o 
FUC, govern-
ment/Libya 
Central/political: Participation of FUC in management of state af-
fairs (vague). Joint follow-up committee to define details. 
Military: Reintegration of FUC combatants into the defense and se-
curity forces (vague). 
Chad,  
October 25, 2007  
(Sirte, Libya) 
RFC, CNT, UFDD, 
UFDDF, govern-
ment/Sudan, Cen-
sad 
Central/political: Joint committee to determine share of rebels in ex-
ecutive domains on all state levels (vague). 
Military: Integration of rebel combatants into the defense and secu-
rity forces (vague). 
Comoros,  
April 23, 1999  
(Antananarivo,  
Madagascar)p 
Representatives of 
Mohéli and Grande 
Comore/OAU, UN, 
and Arab League as 
guarantors 
Political: Large prerogatives with the individual islands (not in-
cluded: defense, foreign policy, monetary, and nationality ques-
tions). Equitable representation of the islands in government, rota-
tion of the position of president between the three islands (in office 
for three years each). National Assembly elected 50% in direct elec-
tions, 50% elected by the Island Assemblies. 
Territorial: Significant autonomy for the islands, change of the de-
nomination of the republic (Union of Comoros Islands). 
Economy: Equitable sharing of resources between the islands and 
the central government. 
Côte d’Ivoire,  
January 14, 2003  
(Linas-Marcoussis, 
France)q 
FPI, RDR, PDCI 
(=major political 
parties); PIT, UDCY, 
UDPCI, MFA (= 
smaller parties); 
MPCI, MPIGO, MJP 
(= rebels)/France 
Central/political: Government of National Reconciliation: equal rep-
resentation of all participating parties; Eligibility: change of consti-
tution to allow Ouattara (RDR) to stand for election. 
Military: Immediate demobilization of government soldiers re-
cruited after the rebellion; amnesty for officers involved in the rebel-
lion, but no clear power-sharing formula for creation of new army. 
Senegal,  
December 30, 2004  
(Ziguinchor,  
Senegal)  
and earlier attempts  
(March 16, 2001) 
MFDC (Abbé Dia-
macoune Senghor), 
government 
No particular power-sharing aspect noted. 
Sierra Leone,  
July 7, 1999  
(Lomé, Togo)r 
Government and 
RUF/four heads of 
state (Liberia, Nige-
ria, Burkina, Togo), 
representatives of 
Côte d’Ivoire and 
Ghana, UN, OAU, 
ECOWAS, Com-
monwealth 
Central/political: Government: Vice president for RUF leader Foday 
Sankoh, one senior ministry (finance, foreign affairs, or justice) plus 
three other cabinet posts and four deputy ministers to RUF. 
Economy: Chairmanship of the Commission for the Management of 
Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development for 
rebel leader Foday Sankoh. 
Military: Ex-combatants of the RUF/SL, CDF and SLA who wish to 
be integrated into the new restructured national armed forces may 
do so provided they meet established criteria. Recruitment into the 
armed forces shall proportionally reflect the geo-political structure 
of Sierra Leone  
Somalia,  
January 29, 2004  
(Nairobi, Kenya)  
Eight out of 38 in-
vited factions 
Central/political: Traditional elders of the four major clans will se-
lect 61 MPs and a coalition of small clans will select 31 MPs—
transitional parliament to elect president. 
Mehler: Power-sharing Arrangements in African Peace Agreements 21 
a Some of the peace agreements are very detailed and touch on related topics to core power-sharing elements. Those 
other main ingredients are not mentioned. 
b No simple witnesses or facilitators (not signing the agreement) are recorded. 
c Text available via www.usip.org/library/pa/angola/angola_04042002.pdf (access December 6, 2007). 
d A ceasefire agreement with the remaining rebel organization FNL was signed on September 7, 2006 in Dar es Sa-
laam, but could not be enacted. The text was not disclosed, but contained some power-sharing elements (military). 
I have not included earlier efforts in the period 2000-2002 that all were connected to the Pretoria agreement that 
specifically dealt with power sharing. Text available via www.usip.org/library/pa/burundi/burundi_10082003.html 
(access December 4, 2007). 
e Text available under www.presidence.dj/LES%20TEXTES/accordreforme.htm (access November 13, 2007). 
f Words used (“accordant une large autonomie aux régions concernées“) in the preceding “accord cadre” of Febru-
ary 7, 2000. 
g Text available via www.usip.org/library/pa/liberia/liberia_08182003_toc.html. 
h Text of Syrte agreement available via www.zokwezo.info/index.php?action=article&numero=268&PHPSESSID=459 
8648c103f552207315957a54fcd50 (access December 4, 2007). 
i Text of the Birao agreement available via www.sangonet.com/afriqg/FichAfriqueCent/Dic/actuC/newsCARind.html 
(access December 3, 2007), the Syrte agreement was not accepted by the UFDR, leading to continued fighting. Mis-
kine and Ringui obviously received personnel allowances and privileges (allusions in www.leconfident.net/ABDOU 
LAYE-MISKINE-A-T-IL-ETE-PIEGE-PAR-L-ACCORD-DE-PAIX-DE-SYRTE-_a2998.html (access December 4, 2007). 
j Text available under www.comores-online.com/Comores-infosweb/Debat/Accord4.htm (access December 3, 2007). 
In the following years numerous new meetings with the active participation of international facilitators, memoran-
dums of understandings, etc. were necessary to avoid a complete collapse of the peace process. Most important 
was a further agreement on modalities under South African mediation (agreement of Moroni, December 20, 2003). 
Those agreements are not listed separately. Bone of contention was the respective competencies between the union 
president and the three island presidents. 
k The civil war had a clear winner: President Sassou Nguesso. This ceasefire agreement with one rebel organization 
was followed by a “national dialogue without exclusion” (which, nevertheless, the main exiled politicians did not 
take part in) and resulted in a meaningless “convention nationale pour la paix” in 2001. New violence erupted in the 
pool region and was officially terminated through a separate agreement with rebel leader Pasteur Ntumi in 2003. 
Part of the Ninja fighters were promised to be integrated into the national army. This did not end violence, though. 
l Text available via www.soirinfo.com/article.php3?id_article=3631 (access December 4, 2007). 
m Text available via www.geocities.com/bureaupolitiquefsd/signature.html (access December 4, 2007). 
n The Comprehensive Peace Agreement is a collection of prior agreements signed over an extended time period be-
tween July 20, 2002 and December 31, 2004. It refers to and contains the crucial agreement on power sharing signed 
in Naivasha, Kenya, on May 26, 2004 and the agreement on wealth sharing, signed in Naivasha on January 7, 2004. 
For an overview of the main aspects see Mattes 2006. Text available via www.usip.org/library/pa/sudan/cpa0109 
2005/cpa_toc.html (access December 6, 2007). 
o Both recent peace agreements for Chad listed here are extremely vague (texts available via the homepage of the 
prime minister of Chad, www.primature-tchad.org (access November 12, 2007). They stand out for their character 
of integrating former rebel combatants in the national army in exchange for stopping hostilities and disarmament. 
This is a common feature of older rebellions in Chad when rebel leaders negotiated their personal entry into the 
government plus the integration of some of their loyal followers in the national army. This has never lead to sus-
tainable peace, but rather created incentives for others to start new rebellions. The most recent agreement was 
worth only the paper it was written on only one month after having been signed. 
p Text available via www.comores-online.com/accueil.htm (access December 3, 2007). Prime Minister Abbas Djoussouf 
is quoted “better a bad agreement than no agreement.” Immediately afterwards (April 30, 1999) a coup d’Etat inter-
rupted the process. New agreements followed (for example, “the first agreements of Fomboni,” in August 2000). 
q Text available via www.usip.org/library/pa/cote_divoire/cote_divoire_01242003.html (access December 4, 2007). 
r Text available via www.usip.org/library/pa/sl/sierra_leone_07071999_toc.html (access December 6, 2007). 
Source: Author’s compilation based on the actual texts of the peace agreement (where available; see separate refer-
ences) and media reports (where not). 
It looks premature to identify success factors from this compilation. In Angola, the govern-
ment was the clear winner of the war and could impose whatever it liked. Djibouti is a badly 
documented case where the regime continued to have a bad human rights record after the 
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peace agreement, but no open violence between the former warring parties could be re-
corded. The Burundian case is an instructive one. This compilation does not contain the 
separate peace process with the remaining rebel organization FNL, so peace was not yet 
achieved with the 2003 arrangements. However, there was a time-consuming process to 
bring along a complex power-sharing arrangement. The polarized nature of the ethnic con-
frontation frozen for a long time-period dating back at least to the 1960s may have contrib-
uted to this. Lijphart may in fact apply better to Burundi than to most other cases in Africa. 
As will be shown, Liberia can be seen as a special case where the power sharing itself was 
far from ideal, but the large peacekeeping mission permitted to quickly come to “phase 2” of 
the transition and provided a sense of security. 
Some of the ambivalent cases and the outright failures also provide lessons: Superficial ne-
gotiations à la Chad will not bring peace one step closer. In the case of Sierra Leone, it was 
not the peace agreement, but rather enforced peace by—mainly British—intervention forces 
that was the key to a late success. 
Let us now turn to our three case-studies and the respective power-sharing formulas con-
tained in formal peace settlements (Liberia 1994-2003, Côte d’Ivoire 2002-2007, Central Afri-
can Republic 1996/97-2007). The selection of those three cases is motivated as follows: All 
three cases have numerous communalities—ex-combatants looking for a new way to earn a 
living, a learned propensity to solve problems through the use of violence, abundance of vic-
tims of violence without proper compensation, important damage done to the material in-
frastructure and to societal trust, etc. This should be the lot of most postconflict countries. 
But there are also differences, the most important one being that the crises of two countries 
received relatively strong international attention, including the search for peace agreements, 
but also translated into strong UN engagements—Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire—while the CAR 
only entered the international agenda seriously after the Darfur crisis in 2006. Before, 
peacemaking and peacekeeping was more or less left to the former colonizer France and lo-
cal allies. The “international engagement factor” in peacemaking and security provision can 
be analyzed with CAR being the control case for the two other cases. But France was also 
very active in peacemaking and peacekeeping in Côte d’Ivoire. Liberia may help to depict 
the weight of the “French factor” (or former colonizer factor). 
It may be noted that in all those crises a high number of additional conflict management initia-
tives were undertaken, inter alia via sanctions by both the African Union and the UN Security 
Council or by on-the-spot mediation by UN representatives. The latter could contain propos-
als for power sharing. Not all of them could be taken into account in the following analysis. 
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3.1 Côte d’Ivoire 
For decades Côte d’Ivoire was a show-case of superficial stability and positive economic de-
velopment. In the 1990s the country gradually entered a slippery slope (Akindès 2004). This 
was intrinsically linked to a failed democratization process in the 1990s. Manipulated elec-
tions (1990, 1995), a problematic succession after the death of founding father Félix 
Houphouët-Boigny to his favorite Henri Konan Bédié, economic crisis and the growing po-
larization between North and South led to the “Christmas coup” in 1999. The following elec-
tions were held without the participation of Bédié and Alassane Ouattara, a former prime 
minister who had created his own party Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR) and was 
consistently sidelined in elections since 1995 for his alleged foreign origins (Burkina Faso). 
The RDR was considered a regionalist party addressing northern grievances (citizens of “sec-
ond rank”—linked to the radical “Ivoirité” ideology, harassment by the security forces, etc.). 
At the elections in 2000, the longtime opponent and founder of the historical opposition party 
Front Patriotique Ivoirien (FPI), Laurent Gbagbo, won against coup leader Robert Guéi who 
unsuccessfully tried to manipulate the outcome in the last minute. Ouattara portrayed him-
self as victim of preelection manipulation and called his mostly Northern supporters to invest 
the streets. This led to clashes with the Gendarmerie loyal to Gbagbo and a number of deaths 
(officially: 57). On September 19, 2002 a well-planned rebellion rocked the foundation of the 
new government. Former student leader Guillaume Soro disclosed himself as the leader of 
the rebels claiming to represent the marginalized North of the country. During retaliation 
acts Guéi was murdered, probably by Gbagbo followers. Death squadrons were formed and 
terrorized the city of Abidjan. The rebellion did not achieve its aim to take over power, but 
the government did not manage to roll back the rebels beyond the Southern part of the coun-
try. After lukewarm support for the government in the first weeks of the confrontation, some 
help by the French troops stationed in Côte d’Ivoire stabilized the situation. 
The list of negotiations and negotiators is long. After a first round under the aegis of 
ECOWAS11 a complex attempt was made by Ivory Coast’s former colonial power France, 
leading to the much cited agreement of Linas Marcoussis (January 23, 2003). Participants 
of the negotiation were all political parties represented in parliament or government plus 
the three rebel organizations Mouvement Patriotique de la Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI), Mouve-
ment Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest (MPIGO), and Mouvement pour la Justice et la 
Paix (MJP).12 The agreement is a very interesting document as it addresses most of the 
most salient political problems of the country, including questions of citizenship with its 
                                                     
11  For an account of the ECOWAS negotiation attempts see Report of the Secretary-General on Côte d’Ivoire, UN Security 
Council, S/2003/374, March 26, 2003, p. 3f. 
12  MPIGO and MJP surfaced in late 2002 in the Western part of the country, in 2003 they merged with MPCI to the so-called 
Forces Nouvelles. 
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ramifications for electoral eligibility, human and civil rights and land ownership.13 In a 
way, the rebellion succeeded where the RDR failed (Tull/Mehler 2005: 390, footnote 49). 
All those reforms would have needed a change of constitution. There is no doubt that 
some of those solutions were not full-heartedly supported by all those who signed the 
agreement. But two other facts were causes for the ultimate failure of the agreement: a) the 
role of France as a patronizing mediator and b) the following power-sharing formula im-
posed shortly afterwards at the so-called Kléber meeting in the conference center of the 
same name in the French capital. It was simply unacceptable to Abidjan (and particularly 
in the army leadership) that the rebels should get the Defence and the Interior portfolio, 
ministries that would give them preponderance in all security issues. The preceding step, 
to make the rebels presentable by inviting them all to negotiations in Marcoussis, was al-
ready difficult to bear for some hardliners of the regime and indeed gave them a political 
weight they previously did not have. While Bédié, Ouattara and Soro were all present in 
person, Gbagbo let himself be represented by party chairman Affi Nguessan. In Abidjan, 
violent demonstrations erupted, French interests were particularly targeted. Soon, Gbagbo 
declared that he would make all constitutional amendments conditional on their approval 
by referendum. Not only would a referendum be difficult to hold over the entire territory, 
but also, Gbagbo felt that he would be in a position to control the outcome. In fact, the 
presidential camp had distanced itself immediately from the agreement upon the delega-
tion’s return to Abidjan, declaring the text a simple draft needing refinement. Therefore, 
the whole agreement—despite its interesting ingredients—had from the onset very bad 
prospects of being implemented. Above all, France had maneuvered itself into a difficult 
situation. The public opinion in Côte d’Ivoire interpreted its mediating role as having 
switched sides from the government to the opposition. 
Some concrete details of the formation of a government of national unity were left to a new 
summit in Accra (Ghana) on March 7, 2003 when the Forces Nouvelles got two senior min-
istries (territorial administration and Communication). Additionally, a 15-strong National 
Security Council was established with all parties represented.14 This could be interpreted as 
a second layer of power sharing (military establishment), the first being the share of gov-
ernment positions. The consensual Prime Minister Diarra was able to build a grand coali-
tion including ten ministries for the FPI, seven each for RDR and PDCI while nine went to 
the rebel union Forces Nouvelles plus six to smaller parties. A compromise was found re-
garding the Interior and Defence Ministries that went to technocrats. The country remained 
                                                     
13  All contained in an annex devoted to the program of the Government of National Reconciliation. A good analysis of the 
agreement can be found in Jessica Kohler: From Miraculous to Disastrous: The Crisis in the Côte d’Ivoire, Centre for Ap-
plied Studies in International Negotiations, Geneva, August 2003. 
14  Text under www.cnddr-ci.org/images/accra2.pdf (access November 12, 2007). 
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divided and this division was frozen by the presence of ECOWAS, and UN peacekeepers—
with French troops at first officially operating under the ECOWAS flag, and later under UN 
mandate (but perceived as being different from both other missions and acting along dif-
ferent prescriptions). The territorial division was in no way the result of a power-sharing 
agreement, but obviously contained some elements of the effects one would have gained 
with any regulations concerning decentralization or regional autonomy, as the northern 
part was no longer under central administration. Even essential commercial flows were 
controlled by a couple of rebel leaders for at least four years. In the following period one 
camp did not agree to disarm; the other would not agree to change the constitution to allow 
for fair elections. 
A short look at the interim agreements of Accra, July 30, 2004 (in the name of ECOWAS), as 
well as those of South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki in the name of the African Union (Pre-
toria I + II, April 6 and June 29, 2005) should be added. Thirteen heads of state (and the UN 
Secretary General) participated in the Accra summit. It set specific deadlines to strengthen 
the dynamics of the peace process.15 No major change of the preceding agreements could be 
recorded. Gbagbo was urged to give the prime minister more prerogatives. Shortly after-
wards Gbagbo reinstalled three opposition ministers of a reconciliation government he had 
suspended only in May (one of them being Soro). The calendar of reforms and of the disar-
mament process was equally revised at Accra. In November a severe crisis of the peace proc-
ess erupted after attacks by the Ivorian army not only on rebel positions but also on a French 
military camp in Bouaké. In the course of the events the French destroyed the Ivorian air 
force. Important anti-French demonstrations and large-scale destruction took place as well as 
the use of firearms by French soldiers against the demonstrators in Abidjan (officially 63 
dead, 1300 wounded). The government of reconciliation continued to exist with rebel minis-
ters mostly absent for security reasons. 
The two Pretoria summits in 2005 saw the participation of Gbgabo, Soro, Ouattara, Bédié 
and Diarra. This meant that minor political parties were no longer part of the game. The 
most important aspect concerned details of article 35 of the Ivorian Constitution concerning 
eligibility.16 Mbeki had found a way to avoid a constitutional referendum by interpreting ar-
ticle 48 of the Ivorian Constitution (exceptional rights of the president) as an instrument for 
Gbagbo to authorize the candidatures of personalities that would be presented by those who 
                                                     
15  This extraordinary presence was probably the main aspect to recall from the agreement, see text www.grip.org/bdg/g4550. 
html. AU Commission chairman Konaré and ECOWAS secretary general Ibn Chambas assisted as well. The same Ivorian 
parties as in Marcoussis and Accra II participated. 
16  The other main points were the immediate ending of violence on the entire territory, disarmament of all militias, imple-
mentation of the DDR process, training of 600 rebels in view of their later integration, return of all rebel ministers to the 
government of national reconciliation, reform of the electoral commission, some parliamentary homework on reform laws, 
extension of a state subsidy to political parties including parties not represented in parliament. 
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have signed the agreement of Linas-Marcoussis (after consultation with president of the Na-
tional Assembly and the Constitutional Court).17 This looked like an apt juridical way out of 
the deadlock that Gbagbo’s stress of constitutionality had created. However, new confronta-
tions of a smaller scale took place even then, and neither the disarmament of the rebels and 
of pro-government militias nor other preconditions for elections were fulfilled in time to al-
low them to take place in this year. The South-African mediation lost credibility when the 
calendar of the peace process could not be kept.18 A new prime minister was imposed on 
Gbagbo. Konan Banny, former director of the regional central bank, influential PDCI mem-
ber and ambitious, was certainly not Gbagbo’s choice. So he tried hard and successfully to 
curtail Banny’s power. The entire year 2006 saw further deadlocks between all sides. 
The signing of the Agreement of Ouagadougou (March 4, 2007) has apparently created a 
much more viable power-sharing arrangement.19 However, with all the prior failures, it ap-
pears premature to be optimistic about long-term effects. What are the main differences be-
tween the agreements of Linas-Marcoussis and Ouagadougou? The first peace plan was put 
on the table and pushed through in about eight days. As good as the intentions may have 
been, it was rushed on the Ivorian actors. It lists important conditions for sustainable peace, 
such as the revision of eligibility rules and the revision of land ownership, but the “imple-
mentation rules,“ that is, the concrete power-sharing formula for a government of national 
reconciliation in the following meeting, were not realistic at all. The Agreement of Ouaga-
dougou was signed by Gbagbo and Soro after a month of intense negotiations (and a still 
longer preparation) in what was called “direct dialogue.”20 The mediator, Blaise Compaoré, 
president of Burkina Faso, himself the third signatory, is an “insider” in contrast to the me-
diators of all preceding agreements. He was very close to the rebels (supporting them even 
militarily in the first place), but gradually became aware of the nefarious effects of the 
Ivorian crisis to his country. A so-called “permanent concertation framework” consisting of 
these three persons, but also Bédié and Ouattara, is the other new element that gives all 
main players a function—and to nobody else (although the latter can be seen as losers of the 
agreement—they could not even sign). The content of the agreement is rather specific and 
gives clear indications on two bones of contention: the issuing of identity papers (crucial for 
voter registration) and the creation of a unified army. On short notice an integrated com-
                                                     
17  See Jeune Afrique, April 17-23, 2005, the interview with President Gbagbo in Jeune Afrique, July 3-9, 2005; and Richard 
Cornwall: Côte d’Ivoire A region at Stake, in African Security Review 14 (2005) 2. 
18  The Forces Nouvelles refused the South African Mediation after it declared that Gbagbo had fulfilled his part of the obliga-
tions. A media battle followed. The South African Government found it necessary to state that if remained committed in a 
communiqué on September 20, 2005 starting with the words “There is no truth to the reports in some newspapers, appar-
ently sourced from French news agencies, that the African Union and Security Council have decided to ask President 
Mbeki to step down from the peace mediation in Cote d’Ivoire” (www.info.gov.za/speeches/2005/05092110451005.htm, ac-
cess September 22, 2005). 
19  Text available under www.soirinfo.com/article.php3?id_article=3631 (access November 12, 2007). 
20  Background reports can be found in Jeune Afrique, March 11-17, 2007, March 25-31, 2007. See also Le Monde, March 13, 2007. 
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mand center was put in place, an important step to create trust.21 The signatories at least 
verbally cared about ongoing local security problems in the confidence zone where impar-
tial forces (UN peacekeepers and the French Licorne mission) were not able to stop massive 
violence by roadblockers. On the other hand, reports by Western NGOs hinted at new at-
tacks after the dismantling of the confidence zone. 
Soro was appointed prime minister shortly after the agreement and presented a new gov-
ernment. The rapid ascension of a political entrepreneur from student leader to rebel leader 
and now head of government therefore continued. One critical aspect has to be signaled: It 
gives a problematic signal to other aspirant youth leaders (that is, “violence pays”), but it 
was apparently unavoidable. All major parties are part of the new government and all sent 
representative personnel to serve where they have competence. The Interior and Defense 
ministries are still held by the FPI. 
An assassination attempt against Soro’s plane at the airport of Korhogo on June 29, 2007 
came as a shock and was attributed to different potential spoilers of the peace process.22 
Soro remained unharmed, but four persons of his entourage were killed. It did not change 
the power-sharing arrangement. But important questions remained unresolved: what to do 
with local rebel commanders and militia leaders close to the president?23 How to dismantle 
the entrenched war economy in both North and South? What about the local theatres of vio-
lence over the last couple of years? And how to deal with the deep mutual distrust inside 
the population? The next serious test of the agreement will be the holding of elections. 
The Linas-Marcoussis and Ouagadougou agreements gave very different signals although 
the later agreement still is formally based on the former. While Linas-Marcoussis singled out 
more root-causes of the armed conflict, it looked less realistic than the Ouagadougou 
agreement that more clearly paid off for rebel leader Soro. More people believed that this 
agreement could bring peace nearer. Here the process mattered more than the content, and 
certainly with regard to the actual power-sharing arrangements much less detailed than in 
the case of Liberia. 
                                                     
21  Herald Tribune, March 17, 2007. 
22  Richard Cornwall: Côte d’Ivoire—Unhappy Landings?, published on the ISS homepage (www.issafrica.org) (access No-
vember 14, 2007). It may be significant that the South African Institute is critical about the recent Ouagadougou peace 
agreement achieved after Mbeki’s mediation more or less failed. 
23  See Jeune Afrique, May 20-26, 2007; Africa Research Bulletin, June 1-30, 2007, p. 17-122; Marchés Tropicaux et Méditerra-
néens, July 6, 2007, p. 48. 
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3.2 Liberia24 
A first civil war started in 1989 with the politico-military entrepreneur Charles Taylor and 
his National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) invading the country from neighboring Côte 
d’Ivoire. Despite rapid gains of terrain, Taylor was not in a position to impose himself com-
pletely, inter alia because most of West Africa’s governments were hostile against him. 
ECOWAS decided to create a joint military intervention force, the ECOWAS Monitoring 
Group (ECOMOG) in 1990, mostly to impede Taylor’s victory. Two other strong militias 
emerged: A split-off of the NPFL under Prince Johnson was responsible for the killing of 
President Samuel Doe. Supporters of the late president formed the United Liberation 
Movement of Liberians for Democracy (ULIMO) which soon split into two ethnic factions 
(Krahn and Mandingo). Smaller groupings emerged as well. After first inconclusive agree-
ments and meetings in Cotonou/Benin (1993), Akosombo/Ghana (1994)25, Accra/Ghana 
(1995) a major breakthrough was recorded:26 In August 1995 the main warring factions 
signed an agreement brokered by Ghana’s president Jerry Rawlings in Abuja. Charles Tay-
lor, still at the head of the strongest military organization agreed to a cease-fire. A ruling 
council of six members was formed, including three main warlords (Charles Taylor, Alhaji 
Kromah/ULIMO-K and George Boley/Liberia Peace Council). Other factions were included 
in the government that could not effectively run the affairs of the country.27 However, hos-
tilities continued and were only stopped after a further agreement in Abuja/Nigeria (1996). 
presidential and parliamentary elections were held in 1997 and led to a clear victory of 
Charles Taylor. 
Amos Sawyer (2004: 451), a prominent Liberian intellectual and former interim president, 
criticizes the peace settlements negotiated to end the violence in Liberia (1996)—and Sierra 
Leone (1998)—particularly for their power-sharing content. Both agreements established 
governments that were “substantially, if not totally, controlled by armed groups whose 
leaders could hardly find in such arrangements sufficient incentive to blunt their greed and 
                                                     
24  There are numerous accounts of the Liberian civil war and its termination, a recent one is Cleaver/Massey 2006; the classi-
cal reference to the first war is Ellis 1999 (focus on cultural/religious aspects). 
25  Akosombo included major power-sharing arrangements: Taylor, Alhaji Kromah and the commander of the Armed Forces 
of Liberia, Hezekiah Bowen, should have become members of a Council of State (five members). Text of the agreement via 
www.usip.org/library/pa/liberia/liberia_09121994.html-II-A (access December 4, 2007). The agreement was cosigned by 
Rawlings and a UN representative. As Werner Korte (1997: 62) notes, it was the first time that warlords were nominated 
representatives of an institution that should be responsible for defending state interests against fellow warlords and inter-
vention forces. 
26  Bekoe counts 16 peace and ceasefire agreements between 1990 and 1997. She details all power-sharing arrangements and 
gives an inside view of motivations of different armed factions to accept or refuse arrangements. She concludes that the in-
cremental steps taken by warring factions count most as they are seen as a concession by the other parties and may be 
matched by other parties (131). This may explain the relative success of the final Abuja arrangements, but this peace was 
certainly not sustainable! 
27  Text available via www.usip.org/library/pa/liberia/liberia_08191995.html (access December 6, 2007). 
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ambition” (451).28 Effectively, a peace brokered this way was not sustainable. When Charles 
Taylor won elections in 1997, partly through intimidation, he could continue his warlord 
politics as elected president. War broke out again in 1999 when a Guinean-backed rebel 
group, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) emerged. The rebellion 
was later joined by a second military group, Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), 
operating from Côte d’Ivoire. 
The renewed civil war ended in 2003 with the LURD rebels close to a military victory by 
July and the negotiated abandonment of Charles Taylor (ceasefire agreement on July 17, 
2003 in Accra/Ghana). The three warring parties plus 18 civilian party representatives met in 
Akosombo and Accra, Ghana, from June 4, 2003 to August 18, 2003, within the framework of 
the ECOWAS Peace Process for Liberia, under the auspices of Ghana’s president John Ku-
four, chairman of ECOWAS, and under the mediation of General Abdulsalami Abubakar, 
former head of state of Nigeria. The Accra Agreement29 contained some obvious power-
sharing contents. While Taylor’s vice president Moses Blah was allowed to run government 
affairs for a short period until October, the transitional institutions were clearly designed ac-
cording to power-sharing prerequisites. No representative of a warring faction could hold 
the position of chairman or vice chairman in the National Transitional Government of Libe-
ria (NTGL). In the end the independent businessman Gyude Bryant became head of the ex-
ecutive branch of government. However, 15 out of 21 cabinet posts were allocated between 
the two rebel movements and the former Taylor government, that is, again a strong majority 
for the warring factions. The Taylor side retained internal affairs, defense, planning and 
economic affairs, health and social welfare, and post and telecommunications; LURD got 
transport, justice, labor and finance and the Ministry of State; MODEL would fill in agricul-
ture, commerce, foreign affairs, public works and land, mines and energy. Taylor’s defense 
minister was thereby allowed to continue in his job. In the legislature some similar problems 
could be encountered. The National Transitional Legislative Assembly was composed out of 
the three warring parties (each 12 seats) and political parties (18), civil society and special in-
terest groups (7) plus one representative each of the different counties (15). A disputed 
LURD leader was made the interim speaker of the Legislative Assembly. This was meant to 
be an interim arrangement. It however showed what the agreement was all about: “The per-
sistent focus at Accra on jobs, cars and money rather than the challenges confronting Liberia 
gives a clue to the character of the transitional government” (ICG 2003: 4). The heavy in-
volvement of peacekeepers later permitted the rushing of national elections, to be held by 
                                                     
28  Jarstad (2006: 23) recalls that in the case of Sierra Leone the Lomé accord of 1999 simply reflected the enhanced bargaining 
position of the RUF rebels due to its military capacity. Consequently, the vice president was allotted to its leader Foday 
Sankoh. Only in 2002 the war could be declared over. 
29  Text under www.usip.org/library/pa/liberia/liberia_08182003_toc.html (access November 10, 2007). 
30 Mehler: Power-sharing Arrangements in African Peace Agreements 
the end of 2005, under a new constitution. Those elections permitted several key figures of 
Taylor’s regime and warlords of the type of Prince Johnson to become elected legislators—
and thereby immunity. Taylor, by contrast, was indicted by the UN-sponsored Special Court 
for Sierra Leone, and finally ended up behind bars in The Hague. 
On the military level the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabili-
tation and Reintegration was formed, with all warring parties contributing. The Accra A-
greement fixed that forces may be drawn from the ranks of the present Government of Libe-
ria forces, the LURD and the MODEL, “as well as from civilians with appropriate back-
ground and experience.” 
No territorial power sharing was provided for in the Accra Agreement as the NTGL was to 
have control over the entire territory of Liberia (Article 21). Economic power sharing was, on 
the surface, not the main purpose of the Accra Agreement, but Article 25 noted, 
Allocation of ministerial positions, deputy and assistant ministerial positions, head-
ship of autonomous agencies, commissions, public corporations and state-owned en-
terprises shall be made to the Parties to this Agreement through a process of negotia-
tion. The allocations as agreed to by the Parties are contained in Annex 4 attached to 
the Agreement. Annex 4 is an integral part of this Agreement. 
According to observers, it was even more worrying than the distribution of political posi-
tions that each warring faction was given key public corporations which would allow them 
to siphon off state resources and thereby fund whatever they please (ICG 2003: 4f). This an-
nex is indeed sharing the spoils between the warring parties at a ratio of four state corpora-
tions to each warring party and two national agencies to each warring party. 
The power sharing involved in the Accra Agreement has been heavily criticized. In the view 
of Amos Sawyer (2004: 454), “fixing the central state is important but insufficient. (…) Au-
thority must be constitutionally shared at other levels of government and local people must 
become empowered participants.” The security architecture proposed by Sawyer would be 
organized across borders and involve, where appropriate, religious bodies and community 
militia units. This seems plausible as numerous local-based ethnic disputes have fuelled the 
civil war at the national level. Liberia’s history of externally brokered agreements is plenty 
of power-sharing devices involving the top level of warring parties. Only the strong and ac-
tive presence of international peacekeepers achieved a respectable degree of stability and se-
curity—and not the power sharing during the transition period. 
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3.3 Central African Republic 
From 1996 to 2007 the CAR experienced a series of violent episodes, with mutinies in 
1996/97; one bloody and a less bloody coup attempt in 2001; a major rebellion in 2002 to 2003 
leading to the capture of the capital Bangui by General Bozizé and the toppling the regime 
of Ange-Félix Patassé; and ongoing rebellions mostly in the Northern parts of the country in 
2006 and 2007. Apart from the unsuccessful coups in 2001 and the outright military victory 
by Bozizé in 2003, all episodes were “managed” through some sort of power sharing be-
tween the regime and ambitious politico-military entrepreneurs. Outside forces played a 
nonnegligible part in all those solutions. 
The first mutiny, April 1996, was indirectly tied to Patassé’s displacement of former benefici-
aries of his predecessor’s regime. André Kolingba effectively had "ethnicized" politics by fa-
voring his fellow Yakoma tribesmen to fill important positions in all spheres of public life. 
With the electoral success of Patassé in 1993 the situation was reversed, Yakoma had to leave 
important posts and were replaced by fellow "Northerners" close to Patassé.30 But it was 
rather in response to arrears in their wages (3-4 years) that some 250 soldiers took to the 
streets and protested. They also demanded an exchange of the army leadership. After clashes 
in which several were killed, some of their corporatist demands were met. Only one month 
later the second mutiny erupted, this time involving 500 soldiers, who claimed that the prom-
ises made were not fulfilled and that certain strategic decisions (the transfer of one regiment 
dominated by Yakoma to the country-side) were unacceptable. France who entertained two 
military bases in the country, intervened militarily, and this time 43 people were killed. 
Negotiations with the help of a French army general resulted in the formation of a new inclu-
sive government, one element of formal power sharing. Four members of the former ruling 
party Rassemblement Démocratique Centrafricain (RDC) as well as four ministers represent-
ing “civil society” were included. Former CAR ambassador to Paris Jean-Paul Ngoupande 
was appointed prime minister on June 6, 1996. He enjoyed some support by the opposition 
and immediately asked for more prerogatives, which Patassé was not willing to concede. 
Violence returned once again in mid-November 1996. 800 rebels were involved, and this 
time they had political aims as well, demanding the resignation of the president. One son of 
Kolingba was involved in the third mutiny, but it remained unclear whether his father 
backed the uprising. The confrontation clearly had become more dangerous after Patassé 
had created his own party militias a few months earlier. Now it was perceived as a threefold 
conflict: between the old and the new regime, between armed supporters of two important 
politicians and, finally, between two still vaguely defined ethno-regional groups as most 
                                                     
30  The following section draws on Mehler 2005. 
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“southern” opposition parties increasingly sided with the rebels. France was now dragged 
into the confrontation, despite the already big distance between governments in Paris and 
Bangui. French troops ultimately were considered to be a conflict party themselves after en-
gaging overtly in military operations. France then pushed for mediation by four African 
presidents who flew in directly from the Franco-African summit in Ouagadougou (Konaré/ 
Mali, Bongo/Gabon, Déby/Chad, Compaoré/Burkina Faso). The efforts of the presidents led 
to the signing of the “Bangui Peace Accord” on January 25, 1997. Mali's ex-president and 
chief mediator Amadou Toumani Touré brokered the entry of two mutineers into an 
enlarged government on April 7, 1997. Note that 25 political parties, the five main trade un-
ions and 12 civil society organizations signed a declaration that was later made part of the 
peace accord. The first postagreement government in February was made up of about 50 
percent opposition and 50 percent pro-president forces. 
It is important to recognizes that these conflicts—and equally as important, the character of 
their resolution—had certain very negative effects on the political climate in the country—
effects that undermined the subsequent prospects for both democracy and the preservation 
of civil peace. The activities of international actors—despite good intentions—effectively 
had contributed to the poisoning of the political environment. 
In the first place, the character of conflict settlements, as promoted by international actors, 
amplified the tension between the principle of accommodation and the practice of exclu-
sionary and privatized politics. International actors continuously asked for a broader repre-
sentation of the radical and partly violent opposition in government. And at some point, 
something close to the objective was achieved: The mutinies of 1996/97 led to the inclusion 
of some rebel leaders in governmental responsibility as brokered by UN and other media-
tors. Patassé also felt compelled to include some opposition members in his government, but 
he was able to hand-pick which members would be included. 
Thus, what appears to have occurred with these conflict settlements was a temporary and 
cosmetic acceptance of inclusive politics, resulting largely from international pressure. The 
practice of inclusion did not however result in any real participation in the decision-making 
process, and indeed seemed to involve more of an extension of rents to those elites with the 
power to disrupt civil peace. That the national assembly later decided to attribute substan-
tial pensions to former presidents Dacko and Kolingba (October 30, 1997) serves as testi-
mony to this. Such pensions were clearly a bonus for renunciation of violence. 
In the second place, a dangerous precedent was established in the resolution of these conflicts. 
A lesson learnt by local actors was that the threat of violence could be instrumentalized to get 
material rewards. For example, the rebels were immediately accepted as a negotiation partner 
and concessions were made quickly—much more quickly than to the civilian opposition. Ex-
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erting violence proved a means to garner international attention, which, at least at first sight, 
proved rewarding. One message emanating from this situation was that those losing out in the 
redistribution of sinecures should retain their capacity to sustain conflicts (inter alia arms). 
This would preserve their capacity to come back to the "dining room" (Mehler 1999).31 
On May 28, 2001 rebels stormed the presidential residence and tried to control the nerve 
centers of the city, particularly the radio station. Fighting raged in several parts of the city. 
The army Chief of Staff and the commander of the Gendarmerie were shot, but no other ma-
jor objective of the rebels was achieved. The loyalists regained the upper hand in the follow-
ing days, supported by at least 300 troops of the rebel leader Jean-Pierre Bemba from the 
neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo plus an uncounted number of Libyan forces and 
helicopters. Kolingba publicly claimed that he orchestrated the rebellion, which reinforced 
the interpretation as a Yakoma uprising. 
In the period that followed the uprising, retaliatory acts targeted all affiliated with Kolingba. 
This included his personal contacts, the RDC and the Yakoma in general. Militia groups af-
filiated with Patassé, for example, “eliminated” several sympathizers of Kolingba. Bangui‘s 
southwestern districts of Bimbo, Petevo, Fatima and Bruxelles, where the mutineers were 
hiding, were the targets of intense shelling. The total number of casualties was officially es-
tablished at 57, but might have exceeded 500 deaths. Kolingba himself went into hiding (and 
later exiled to Uganda). A persecution of Yakoma families began, houses in specific parts of 
the capital were destroyed (360 alone in the neighborhood of Ouango) and 80,000 inhabi-
tants fled to the country-side or, predominantly, crossed the river Oubangui to the RDC. 
Parallel investigations caused an atmosphere of general suspicion. The dismissal and later 
accusation of the chief of staff Gen. François Bozizé of being implicated in a new coup plan 
gave a new turn to events. Bozizé refused to accept an arrest warrant. On November 3, 2001, 
the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative in CAR, General Lamine Cissé, under-
took a good offices mission to bring the two parties together. On the basis of unwritten con-
cessions by both parties, President Patassé promised to appoint General Bozizé to another 
post and to consider granting a pardon once the judicial procedure was completed while 
Bozizé seemed to be willing to be questioned by the Commission of Inquiry. But four days 
later government troops attacked Bozizé's positions.32 Bozizé now defected with about 100 
troops and moved to the north of the country. After taking weapons from several gendar-
merie barracks and a number of skirmishes, Bozizé went into exile in Chad. 
                                                     
31  The CAR example is in line with the argument by Bratton and van de Walle, who claim that a transition from neo-
patrimonial rule is prone to a violent abortion because of the tendency of the democratically elected new president to dis-
tribute according to a neo-patrimonial logic, but this time not to the same circle of persons. Cf. Michael Bratton/Nicolas van 
de Walle: Democratic Experiments in Africa. Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge 1997, p. 269. 
32  See report of the UN Secretary General to the UN Security Council, S/2002/12, January 2, 2002. 
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Hectic diplomatic activity in early December 2001 included Libyan-led initiatives in the 
framework of COMESSA (Community of Sahelo-Saharian States—or CEN-SAD for the Ara-
bic abbreviation), putting forward the idea of a peacekeeping force, and a Gabon-led initia-
tive in the framework of CEMAC (Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa) 
focusing rather on dialogue processes. A small peacekeeping force from Sudan and Djibouti 
was deployed in February 2002. It is obvious that neither the AU nor the larger international 
community were eager to get involved (again), CAR was left to subregional organizations 
and their limited peacekeeping capacities. 
Bozizé’s troops came back to Bangui with a surprise attack on October 25, 2002. They were re-
pulsed after heavy fighting once again involving Libyan troops and up to 1,000 fighters of the 
Congolese rebel organization Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC) on Patassé’s side. 
Patassé offered a “national dialogue without exclusion” at New Year’s Eve, but only gradu-
ally received support for the idea. He seemed completely isolated, the country devastated, 
and democracy in shambles when a surprise attack by Bozizé’s troops (helped by Chad) led 
to the downfall of Bangui. Patassé was at a COMESSA summit in Niger. Upon his return he 
could not land, was forced to fly to Cameroon and finally took exile in Togo. Bozizé sus-
pended the constitution and named a new cabinet including most opposition parties with 
Goumba as vice president (in order to profit form his image as a spotless politician). A Na-
tional Transitional Council (CNT) as an all-party body was introduced to serve as Interim 
legislative body. The postponed national dialogue was held from September 15 to October 
27, 2003 and resulted in a sober assessment of the country’s situation. Despite numerous 
statements of forgiveness and reconciliation the climate of distrust continued. 
The “national dialogue” process in September/October 2003 was fairly successful and led to 
a set of consensus decisions in major fields of public life (particularly on the electoral proc-
ess). Reconciliation ceremonies between historical rivals (for example, Goumba-Dacko) had 
high symbolical value. However most of the important questions were not addressed and 
forgiveness was asked and given but no debate on the underlying causes was engaged. 
Following a constitutional referendum in late 2004, CAR prepared for national elections 
marking the end of the transition period in 2005. Bozizé stood as a presidential candidate al-
though he first declared that he would step down after the transition phase. Initially, most 
competitors were barred from standing and only after a mediation by Gabon’s President 
Bongo and the readmittance of most aspirants was there a new chance for fair elections.33 In 
the end the elections were technically more or less acceptable, while not entirely fair (par-
ticularly the legislative ones). Bozizé included some heavyweights of the political class into 
                                                     
33  Details of the agreement reported by Radio Centrafrique, Bangui, in French 18:30 GMT, January 23, 2005, as reported by the 
BBC Monitoring Service, January 23, 2005. 
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his government, including a son of Kolingba, but excluding the Patassé camp. So-called lib-
erators, partly Chadian mercenaries, partly CAR nationals who helped Bozizé taking power, 
increasingly posed a security threat in the capital Bangui and extorted money from inhabi-
tants. They were later transported to the border with the help of the Chadian government, 
some became later rebel fighters. 
The climate of insecurity became more commonplace in the second half of 2005. On October 
30-31, the Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement (UFDR), one rebel or-
ganization, attacked the provincial capital Birao, killing ten soldiers and taking the town. 
Subsequently, other towns fell to the rebels. A quarter of all provinces were at least partly in 
the hands of rebels or faced the prospect of sliding into violent conflict. Surprisingly, on No-
vember 20 the rebel leader Michel Djotodia and his spokesman Abakar Sabon were arrested 
and held in Benin. 
While the UFDR rebels asked for negotiations under international mediation, Bozizé was 
more than reluctant. The only noteworthy signal was when the head of state held a one-day 
forum in the National Assembly on July 28 as a limited form of dialogue with all “vibrant 
parts of the society,” during which he at least did not rule out direct talks with rebels. The 
meeting was snubbed by several opposition leaders. 
Cooperation with France intensified after the rebel conquest of northern towns in Novem-
ber. In a dramatic radio message, the government appealed to the international community 
and “friendly nations, in particular those linked by specific treaties, particularly France, to 
work for the restoration of the territorial integrity.” The response was immediate. France 
used six Mirage fighter jets to combat rebels in accordance with the military pact linking 
both countries. About 300 French soldiers took part in the operation. A week later, Birao was 
recaptured with massive French help, and the other towns soon followed. The extreme vul-
nerability of the regime was laid bare by these events. Nine years after the closure of its two 
military bases in CAR, France was back. 
But most international donors continued to exert pressure on Bozizé to start negotiations 
with the rebels, and Bozizé gave in by announcing a direct dialogue in his New Year’s 
speech on December 31, 2006. Talks started under Libyan aegis. Bozizé met Abdoulaye Mi-
skine, a dreaded warlord, on January 25. The so-called agreement of Syrte was agreed upon 
after an extremely short series of meetings (January 29-31, 2007), also involving some “wise 
men” such as Pasteur Isaac Zokouè.34 In early February 2007, Miskine, believed to be close 
to former president Patassé, returned to Bangui and was made advisor to the president (he 
later declined the offer). Miskine was said to have links to practically all operating rebel 
movements, particularly the Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain (FDPC), but also 
                                                     
34  A telling report can be found at www.zokwezo.info/index.php?action=article&numero=269 (access December 4, 2007). 
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to the UFDR. The content of the peace agreement was limited, and included an immediate 
ceasefire. A vague reference was made at “the participation of FDPC and UFDR at the man-
agement of state affairs, in a spirit of reconciliation and in conformity with the Constitu-
tion.”35 It is noteworthy that civil society groups immediately criticized the agreement for an 
amnesty offered to Miskine (who remained indicted at the International Criminal Court at 
the Hague).36 The UFDR commanders and others distanced themselves from the treaty and 
new attacks on Birao were launched. The French army had to intervene again.37 A separate 
peace agreement with UFDR was signed on April 13.38 Two official UFDR leaders held in 
Benin were promised to profit from an amnesty if they would accept the deal (they did not). 
On April 24, 2007 another rebel organization not yet part of negotiations attacked an army 
convoy. Shortly before, the army had conducted one of its famous raids in the north-west of 
the country. The Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la Démocratie (APRD) remained 
excluded from the peace process, continued to fight and to appeal for an inclusive dia-
logue.39 A preparatory committee to organize the inclusive national dialogue was agreed 
upon in October 2007, with rebels holding only 3 of 23 positions. Criminal gangs, raids by 
the military and the absence of any state order continued to endanger the security of most 
citizens of the CAR by early December 2007.40 
The CAR experience with power sharing stands out for having been very reluctantly en-
gaged in by the heads of state (Patassé and Bozizé),41 because the details of the dialogue 
process were criticized by the civilian opposition, and because the overall limited achieve-
ments did not help in bringing about more security for ordinary people. 
Although all three cases differ in the form civil war has taken, there is one striking common-
ality: the readiness of the international community to advocate or facilitate a strong power-
sharing ingredient of peace agreements and this to the benefit of armed rebel movements (or 
their leaders). This seems not to be a function of the strength of international engagement, as 
power sharing could be a cheap solution (CAR) or a rather expensive and transitional one 
                                                     
35  Text of Syrte agreement available via www.zokwezo.info/index.php?action=article&numero=268&PHPSESSID=4598648c 
103f552207315957a54fcd50 (access December 4, 2007). 
36  See www.zokwezo.info/index.php?action=article&numero=274. 
37  A military source was quoted by Agence France Press as saying, "Les rebelles veulent peut-être peser dans les négociations, 
ou montrer que Miskine n'a pas autorité sur eux." 
38  Text of Birao agreement available via www.sangonet.com/afriqg/FichAfriqueCent/Dic/actuC/newsCARind.html (access 
December 4, 2007). 
39  Press statement of November 11, 2007, available via www.sangonet.com/afriqg/FichAfriqueCent/Dic/actuC/newsCARind. 
html (access December 6, 2007). 
40  Human Rights Watch published a damning report with the title ”Etat d’anarchie. Rébellions et exactions contre la popula-
tion civile“ in September 2007 available via http://hrw.org/french/reports/2007/car0907/ (access December 4, 2007). APRD 
and government finally signed a ceasefire agreement on April 9, 2008, reactions were mixed, see www.sangonet.com/afriqg 
/FichAfriqueCent/Dic/actuC/newsCARind.html. 
41  It would be useful to apply the game-theoretical model of Addison and Murshed (2002) to the CAR case. Here the loss of 
reputation by cheating previous peace agreements has important explanatory power for the readiness to conclude of the 
other conflict party and the sustainability of the following agreements. The reputation of both Patassé and Bozizé as reli-
able partners in peace agreements must be regarded as low as both have stepped out of their promises repeatedly. 
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(Liberia). Liberia has made it to “phase 2” of a peace process, not without difficulties and not 
without strong external engagement. Building solid institutions, not least in the justice sector 
will be crucial if “peace should be won.” In Côte d’Ivoire and Central African Republic civil-
ian political parties have suffered a setback not only because of war, but also because of the 
way peace was negotiated—from outside and above, “phase 2” was not yet in sight by the 
end of 2007. The “French factor” played an important role in this. The increasing volatility of 
French engagement—strong engagement in CAR in 1996, and disengagement since 1997; 
declining to help Patassé in 2001/2; strong engagement at the side of Bozizé in 2006/7; no 
help for Bédié in Côte d’Ivoire 1999; and ambivalent intervention in 2002—also made it dif-
ficult to see it as a guarantor of any peace settlement. 
4 Conclusion 
Although some positive effects of power sharing can be assumed to have resulted from 
some recent peace agreements as previous grievances are addressed, the existing critique on 
power sharing as an impediment to sustainable peace is largely supported by this paper’s 
analysis. Additionally, the potential long-term negative consequences of power sharing on 
democracy can be detected in some of the cases (Mehler/Tull 2005, Jarstad 2006). Examining 
a full sample of recent African cases from 1999 onwards (Table 1) clearly shows that at least 
some power-sharing devices are present in most peace agreements, while the specific as-
pects (political, military, territorial, economic) can vary. The cementing of group boundaries 
through power-sharing agreements is problematic in several of the African cases, not least 
for the democratic content of the postwar polity. Additionally, incentives are created to eth-
nicize any issue in order to obtain concessions leading to a mutual escalation of demands. 
In examining more closely the realities of the three cases of Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, and Central 
African Republic, it becomes clear that there are even more aspects of power sharing that 
need attention and would profit from a large-N examination—beyond the African cases: 
1) Who is defining the constitutive parts of the polity, and what are the “ethnic” groups 
which supposedly need accommodation (Connor 2004)? Who is defining their group 
boundaries? Who is entitled to speak for such a community? And above all, who is invited 
to the negotiation table? After all, our cases show the carelessness of outside actors when 
deciding upon those issues, either by inviting prewar political formations with unclear 
popular credentials or, even more frequently, by bringing in vociferous political-military 
entrepreneurs and rebel organizations with one main quality: spoiling capacities. Not in 
one case can we detect an effort to ask communities about their sense of the problems and 
the legitimacy of those sitting at the negotiation table, sometimes explicitly in their name. 
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2) The second problematic aspect of the settlement practice is the systematic assumption that 
the conflict is ethnopolitical in nature (particularly when it comes to Africa). While Bu-
rundi’s civil war has an obvious ethnic coloration and significance, this is much more dif-
ficult to assert for, for example, Comoros, Liberia, and Central African Republic (more ob-
viously: center-periphery domination), with Côte d’Ivoire being a rather complicated case 
where region, religion, and also generation play important roles in defining the salient 
cleavages. 
3) The local level not only of a) conflict generation and b) escalation, but also of c) conflict 
management and d) security production is more often than not completely neglected in 
peace negotiations. The importance of this level in all four respects is thus neglected. Na-
tional power sharing cannot bring a solution at the local level and may even impede local 
solutions to problems that were at the root of an armed conflict. 
4) And finally, mainstream peace research is more than problematic when it comes to the 
definition of what a conflict is. The conventional 1,000 battle-death definition of a civil war 
(according to the battle-death database) does not account for what is relevant to the popu-
lation. The perceptions of the population as to whether there is/was a violent conflict and 
whether it was interrupted, terminated, or settled (or whether it continues) are obviously 
important, not least for the decision of whether a peace settlement was successful. But this 
issue is rarely analyzed. 
Therefore, the entire discussion about power sharing and sustainable peace looks inherently 
flawed when it does not focus on what peace is all about: security for the people. Local sus-
tainability might also be the real test of the most recent major power-sharing agreement on 
the continent: In Kenya, an extended government introducing a prime minister and two 
deputy prime ministers was the result of foreign-sponsored mediation initiatives to solve a 
bloody postelectoral conflict. No single provision touches on the local level of security pro-
vision, for example, in the hardest-hit zones of violence both in Kisumu and some poor 
neighborhoods of the capital Nairobi. This may turn out to be problematic. In practical 
terms—and when proposals should be drawn from such an analysis—this probably calls for 
a) more weight for multitrack diplomacy (Miall 2004), not only in Sri Lanka and the Balkans 
but also in Africa, and b) critical attention to local security provision as part of peace agree-
ments. After all, only tailor-made, intensely debated, and maybe only transitional power-
sharing arrangements can have beneficial effects. Such effects will by no means automati-
cally arrive when a peace agreement has been signed. 
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